Safe For Decolonization by S. R. Joey Long

Author:S. R. Joey Long [Long, S. R. Joey]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, United States, 20th Century, Political Science, International Relations, General
ISBN: 9781606350867
Google: pZ9MAQAAMAAJ
Publisher: Kent State University Press
Published: 2011-01-15T00:41:47+00:00

SEATO’s Shadow on the 1956 Constitutional Talks

British policymakers, especially from the Defence Ministry, believed that Singapore had assumed strategic significance beyond that of a mere British military base after September 1954. They asserted that the island’s military installations appeared strategically critical “not only to ourselves but to the whole non-Communist world.”33 Military plans crafted by SEATO officials reinforced that view. Contained within those plans was the assumption that bases such as Singapore would perform critical logistic and operational functions. If communists subverted the island, SEATO’s military operations would be gravely compromised.34 American officials shared similar outlooks. State Department officer Kenneth Young stated that the military forces in Singapore and Malaya were “the strongest real backing for the Manila Pact outside of U.S. capabilities.” Their capitulation to communist subversion would undoubtedly “weaken confidence in the Free World position in Asia.”35 Added Consul William Anderson: “If elected Government officials [in Singapore] can be induced to demand the withdrawal of ‘foreign forces’ and proclaim a policy of ‘neutralism,’ a major blow will have been struck at the SEATO structure.”36

The Americans would independently generate a list of responses to address their concerns in Singapore, but the political question and Singapore’s future links with SEATO remained a conundrum that the British had to resolve. They were determined to “honour our treaty obligations.”37 They were also confronted, however, by strong local pressures for self-government. For most Defence Ministry and Foreign Office officials, the best outcome would be for Malaya and Singapore—as a merged and independent political entity—to join SEATO. But this was easier desired than done. First, though Malaya’s chief minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, might carry the ball for Malaya, Singapore’s leaders had expressed wariness of SEATO.38 Second, following the 1955 riots, British military officers such as General Charles Loewen of General Headquarters, Far East Land Forces (GHQFELF), had begun to frown on the pace of political reforms in Singapore. These reforms appeared to be proceeding at the expense of British strategic interests, and communists appeared to be exploiting the more open political environment to strengthen their movement. Loewen was especially spoiling for a fight with militants. “No doubt some people will get killed,” he wrote Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Sir John Harding, “but I am all for clearing the air.”39 With the approach of constitutional talks between Chief Minister David Marshall and Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd in regard to transferring more power to locals, Loewen pointedly appealed to British policymakers to protect UK military interests on the island. Only by doing so, he contended, could Britain fulfill its obligations to regional institutions such as SEATO.40

In October 1955, the British Defence Coordinating Committee, Far East (BDCCFE), followed up on Loewen’s appeal by formally submitting to London a list of British military privileges it wanted preserved in Singapore. These included the right to permit allied forces from organizations such as SEATO to use the bases, entitlements to control lands for military purposes, and British control of internal security.41 The demands were endorsed by the top brass in London.

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